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Public behaviour in response to the COVID-19
pandemic: understanding the role of
group processes
John Drury, Holly Carter, Evangelos Ntontis and Selin Tekin Guven
Background
In the absence of a vaccine, behaviour by the public is key to the
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, as with other types of
crises and emergencies, there have been doubts about the
extent to which the public are able to engage effectively with the
required behaviour. These doubts are based on outdatedmodels
of group psychology.
Aims and argument
We analyse the role of group processes in the COVID-19
pandemic in three domains: recognition of threat, adherence by
the public to the required public health behaviours (and the
factors that increase such adherence) and actions of the many
community mutual aid groups that arose during lockdown. In
each case, we draw upon the accumulated research on behav-
iour in emergencies and disasters, as well as the latest findings in
relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, to show that explanations in
terms of social identity processes make better sense of the
patterns of evidence than alternative explanations.
Conclusions
If behaviour in the pandemic is a function of mutable group
processes rather than fixed tendencies, then behavioural
change is possible. There was evidence of significant change in
behaviour from the public, particularly in the early days of the
pandemic. Understanding the role of group processesmeans we
can help design more effective interventions to support collect-
ive resilience in the public in the face of the pandemic and other
threats. We draw out from the evidence a set of recommenda-
tions on facilitating the public response to COVID-19 by harnes-
sing group processes.
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In the absence of a vaccine, public behaviour is key to the response to
the COVID-19 pandemic.1,2 The virus spreads through close contact
between people and via surfaces, and so the actions that members of
the public have taken to protect themselves and others include phys-
ical distancing (although ‘social distancing’ is the term used by many
governments, theWorld HealthOrganization3 recommends the term
‘physical distancing’ as more accurate), regular hand-washing,
working from home, wearing face coverings and self-isolating if
they have symptoms. As in the case of other crises, some were doubt-
ful about the extent to which the public would be willing and able to
behave in the required ways. Often these doubts were based on the
assumption that there is a generic behavioural tendency in such
events, grounded in a narrowly self-interested or psychologically
fragile human nature.4 Previous research on human responses to
emergencies and disasters has indeed demonstrated some common
patterns of behaviour in such events. In contrast to the most pessim-
istic expectations, however, collectively resilient behaviours – in par-
ticular, public mutual cooperation – are relatively common.5 But
more importantly, this research and the resultant theory suggest
the social and psychological conditions under which public behaviour
in crises takes one form rather than another. Some of the most
important conditions are to do with group processes, which refers
to people’s psychological memberships of groups or social categories
and their relationship with others outside the group. Understanding
behaviour in the pandemic as a function of mutable group processes,
rather than fixed psychological tendencies, means a greater under-
standing of behavioural change – both analysing it and designing
interventions to facilitate it.
The effects of a pandemic are much more dispersed in time and
space than those of other emergencies, such as fires, earthquakes
and terrorist attacks. Yet, like these other kinds of emergencies, a
pandemic such as COVID-19 represents a mortal threat that
creates collective fear. In all cases, immediate and dramatic
responses are required. Therefore, in this article, as well as referring
to recent research on public responses to COVID-19, we draw upon
the accumulated research on behaviour in emergencies and disasters
to provide insights into the role of group processes in the pandemic.
Our examples of behaviour and policy in the pandemic comemostly
from the UK context, as that is where the authors are based.
However, we suggest that most of our points are transferable to
the situation in other countries.
The starting point for a behavioural response to an emer-
gency is the recognition of the threat,6 so the first part of the
article will cover what we know about when and how people per-
ceive threats. The second part will focus on adherence by the
public to the required public health behaviours and the factors
that increase such adherence. The third part examines the deter-
minants of neighbourhood support and the many community
mutual aid groups that arose during lockdown. Finally, we
draw out from the review of evidence three recommendations
on facilitating the public response to COVID-19 by harnessing
group processes.
When and how people perceive threats
‘Panic’ is a popular view of how people respond in emergencies.7
There are various definitions of panic, but one thing that distin-
guishes the concept from related notions such as fear and flight is
the idea of overreaction to a perceived threat.
A basic empirical problem with the concept of panic in the
context of mass emergencies is that of measurement:8 in an emer-
gency, how do we know if fear is ‘excessive’? At the time, what
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counts as an overreaction is typically a subjective judgement. Post
hoc, it is easier to judge, but then it is no longer a description of
someone’s mental state and is not explanatory.
For example, at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, was the
extra shopping that some people carried out – so-called ‘panic
buying’ – really excessive? On what criteria? If people believe
(a) that they may have to stay home for prolonged periods of
time, or (b) that other people will soon empty the shelves, or both
(a) and (b), it is logical to buy additional goods. It may be excessive
from the point of view of the observer, but psychologically it might
be an understandable reaction to a perceived threat.
The panic concept is sometimes used to claim that public over-
reaction to signals of danger is a major cause of death in emergen-
cies.9 But most sources suggest that people are more likely to die
from ignoring or reacting too slowly to indications of danger than
they are from overreacting.6 Indeed, public underreaction to
signals of threat in emergencies and disasters is common.10 This
pattern of response has sometimes been characterised as evidence
of an ‘optimistic bias’.11 But there are a number of group-level psy-
chological factors that determine the extent to which people
respond to (versus discount) signals of impending emergency.
The first factor is the historical context. For example, if there has
not been an earthquake locally in 100 years, people may not see the
point in engaging in preparedness. But when they have had experi-
ence of quakes and other disasters, preparedness activities
increase.12 In fact, signal detection theory13 would suggest that,
given the frequency and magnitude of genuine threats, the belief
that ‘it won’t happen to us’ can actually reverse, and people
become extremely vigilant about potential signals of danger. For
example, in London in 2017, following a series of terrorist attacks
earlier in the year, hundreds of people in Oxford Street fled in
fear from a noise that turned out to be harmless.
The second factor is self-relevance. Self or identity exists at
many levels, from personal identity (e.g. ‘I’ as an individual with
unique personal characteristics) to the many social identities that
are important to us based on our group memberships (e.g., national
identity [‘us’ as British people’] or religious identity [‘us’ as
Muslims]). The social categories we belong to can affect whether
we perceive threats as relevant,14 and can facilitate either adherence
to protective behaviours or the adoption of risky behaviours.15 If the
threat of COVID-19 is understood principally in relation to the
individual, then those individuals least at risk (those young and
healthy) may well feel it is unnecessary to change their behaviours.
Indeed, they might also feel they have a right to take risks with their
own health.16 Thereby they continue to act in ways that put others at
risk of infection. This perceived lack of self-relevance may be one
reason why younger people have been among those with lower
levels of adherence with public health regulations such as staying
at home during ‘lockdown’.17 By contrast, where people perceive
‘us’ as being at risk, they are less likely to discount that risk.14
Most information about impending threat in a potential or
actual emergency is indirect, or socially mediated: people do not
see flames, rather they hear a fire alarm or they see others escaping.
The third factor in perceiving threat is therefore communication
about that threat, which needs to come from a trusted source.
A source that provides too many false positives can lead to false nega-
tives in behavioural response, as in the poor public response rate to
fire alarm bells.18 Conversely a trusted source can convince there is
a threat, even when it is novel and invisible. In the early weeks of
the pandemic in the UK, trust in the government was high,19 as
were public concerns about the threat of the virus20 (and those
who denied the threat, for example, by drawing upon conspiracy the-
ories or through mistrust of science,21 were in the minority).
Communication and hence influence regarding threat occurs
not only through deliberate attempts (such as alarms and warnings),
but also through observed examples of others’ conduct. What our
peer groups, family, community and others appear to feel safe
doing can serve to convey what it is safe for us to do. In all these
cases, trustworthiness is linked to shared identity. When the
source is seen as one of ‘us’, we are more likely to see their messaging
and behaviour as relevant, more likely to listen, and more likely to
follow their instructions or their example. This has been demon-
strated in both ‘normal’ life22 and in relation to the COVID-19
pandemic.23
Adherence to the required public health behaviours
Most of the required public health preventive behaviours during the
COVID-19 pandemic involved some sacrifice of personal freedoms.
Staying home and other aspects of lockdown were costly and
onerous for most people, and much more for some groups than
for others.24 Before lockdown in the UK, some doubted whether
the public had the mental strength to endure these privations over
time. This was most clearly expressed in early March by the Chief
Medical Officer, who stated ‘There is a risk if we go too early
people will understandably get fatigued and it will be difficult to
sustain this over time’.25 This notion of ‘fatigue’ as a form of psycho-
logical frailty4 was quite separate from the expected stresses of quar-
antine26 and the mental health toll for many people (contrary to
some claims, the notion of ‘behavioural fatigue’ was not suggested
by behavioural scientists advising the UK Government; rather,
those participating in SPI-B, the SAGE subgroup on behaviour, cri-
ticised the concept25,27). This contemporary concern with public
mental fragility parallels government fears in the Second World
War of public panic, shelter mentality and widespread breakdown
in response to the Blitz.28 In both cases, there was a debate
around the extent to which coercion would be needed to enforce
public adherence.
Research on behaviour in other public health emergencies has
shown that people would be willing to undergo prevention andmiti-
gation measures at high personal cost, where these are perceived as
legitimate public health interventions and where the relevant
authority is respected and is seen as in-group (rather than as
‘other’). A good example is mass casualty decontamination, which
is a procedure undertaken to remove contaminants from the skin
of a potential casualty in the event of a chemical, biological, radio-
logical or nuclear incident. Because the procedure can involve
removing clothes in a public place, those affected may perceive
decontamination as more threatening than the incident itself.
Reviews of the literature find that any failure by responders to con-
sider casualties’ psychosocial needs can lead to failures of the pro-
cedure, including people leaving the scene still contaminated and
therefore endangering their families and communities.29 The
reviews also showed that the use of coercive measures (threats,
force, shouting) had a backfire effect rather than enhancing effective
public engagement. However, when responders managing the pro-
cedure explained the importance of decontamination and provided
regular updates about their actions, this increased perceptions of the
legitimacy of the procedure among casualties. In turn, this enhanced
shared identification between emergency responders and members
of the public. Shared identification predicted: reduced public
anxiety;30 greater public adherence with the procedure, cooper-
ation,30,31 and greater speed and efficiency of the decontamination
process.32 Subsequent research has demonstrated that effective
engagement with the decontamination procedure is also increased
when casualties perceive the effectiveness of the measures.33
Although staying at home and distancing more generally during
lockdown were experienced as onerous, adherence rates were very
high in the UK. (Adherence rates for self-isolation were much
lower.34 As well as the commitment, this is likely to be because of
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material constraints, such as not having the financial support or
support for shopping needs, and not understanding what self-isola-
tion actually requires.35,36) This was the case on both behavioural
measures37 and self-report measures across multiple sample.19,38
These high rates of adherence suggest that the public were indeed
psychologically able to make the required sacrifices.39
A number of studies have now looked at predictors of this
adherence. In addition to the perceived effectiveness of public
health measures,40 many studies have identified group processes
including social identification, similar to those evidenced in the
decontamination research. Thus the Office for National Statistics
data showed that at the same time that adherence rates were high
during the strict lockdown, there was a strong sense among
members of the public that people were becoming more united,41
suggesting a possible association between the two. The association
between group processes, such as shared identification, and adher-
ence to (or support for) public health measures, has now been
demonstrated in cross-sectional and longitudinal survey studies as
well as in experiments. Thus predictors include perceived norms
within valued social groups,42 identification with one’s commu-
nity,43 sense of public duty,44 empathy with vulnerable groups,45
the belief that ‘we’re all in it together’ (which was found to be
more important than threats of coercion),46 social capital,47 national
identification,48 horizontal collectivism21 and belief in shared values
of security and responsibility.49 Overall, these factors evidence the
importance of a sense of collectivity, at the group, community or
national level, that has driven adherence behaviours.
There has been some shaming and stigmatising of those who are
perceived not to be adhering.50 However, structural inequalities
have been shown to affect ability to comply.24 In the same way
that disadvantaged demographics are overrepresented in the
infection and death figures,25,51 some groups have been less able
to distance and were obliged to go into work on sometimes
crowded trains, and were limited to busy public spaces when
taking exercise.
As lockdown in the UK eased over May, June and July 2020,
there was evidence that public adherence to the rules declined.52,53
Other developments over the same period suggest possible explana-
tions for this decline more in line with the factors described above
than behavioural fatigue.
First, the official messaging changed. In May, the official slogan
‘stay at home’ was replaced with ‘stay alert’, shifting from a clear
behavioural imperative to a somewhat vaguer instruction on how
to feel. There were also a large number of government announce-
ments on changes to the rules in May, June and July. There is
some evidence that official communications were becoming less
effective both in communicating risk and in providing information
on mitigations. Over this period, perceptions of being unsafe
reduced54 and public knowledge of the rules declined.55 Further,
the most significant relaxation of lockdown – which included
being allowed to visit a pub, cafe or restaurant, museum, library,
theme park, cinema, hotel, hairdresser or barber – that took place
on 4 July, appeared to have a strong signalling effect (not least,
perhaps, because these were heralded in the mass media as
‘freedom’ and as the ‘end of lockdown’). Thus, surveys report
drops in people’s reported adherence to physical distancing
shortly afterward.53,56
Second, there were some significant changes in terms of national
unity and the public’s relationship with the government that inter-
acted with these problems with communication. A number of
sources show that the sense of national unity that was evident at
the start of the pandemic declined over time.57 The notion that
‘we are all in it together’ was flatly contradicted by the evidence
that structural differences between groups – the greater economic
losses in terms of jobs and pay for some and not others, and the
mounting evidence of particular risk among ethnic minorities51 –
was being exacerbated by the pandemic.
A significant feature of this decline in a sense of national unity
was a loss of trust in the UK Government. In particular, lack of gov-
ernment repentance over the actions of one special advisor, who
admitted breaking the rules on lockdown, served to communicate
that there were one set of rules for the privileged and another set
for everyone else who had made the sacrifices of staying at home
and not visiting family; this decline in trust was in turn associated
with a drop-off in adherence.58 (Other research59 suggests that
there were two types of public response to this incident. First,
there was cynicism about the rules, which was associated with
lower levels of physical distancing adherence. Second, those who
were angry about the actions of the government advisor were less
likely than others to believe that it was acceptable to bend the
rules, but more likely than others to comply with the guidelines
themselves. This latter pattern is in line with Stephen Reicher’s sug-
gestion that the advisor would be seen as an anti-role model.60)
Neighbourhood support and community mutual aid
groups
Government policies such as the community resilience pro-
gramme61,62 are a recognition that public involvement, in the
form of active support for others affected, is a necessary part of
emergency response. (Although governments started officially
acknowledging this after 9/11,63 some disadvantaged groups have
long made their own resilience plans in the knowledge that the
state will not provide them with the support and resources they
need in times of crisis.64) Research on emergencies and disasters
shows that such public involvement is common.65 Of course, not
every member of the public provides support; and some emergency
events evidence more support behaviours from the public than
others. But more lives are saved by the ‘average’ citizen, whether
‘bystander’ or fellow survivor, than are saved by professionals.5
How does this public support come about? Research on a variety
of emergencies and disasters suggests that an underlying mechan-
ism is that of a shared social identity among those affected.65
Shared social identity facilitates support in three ways. It motivates
people to give support to others (since their interest is seen as ‘our’
interest).65 It increases expected support within the in-group (and
hence enables a coordinated response).66 And it means that offers
of help are perceived as genuine rather than reflecting ulterior
motives (which means that the help is more likely to be accepted).67
Most group identities reflect long-standing group memberships;
hence, existing social capital is one of the major factors in commu-
nity resilience.68 But an emergency can also create a completely new
group identity or sense of ‘we-ness’ among those affected, based on
common fate.69 Further, in this context, the supportive behaviour of
fellow in-group members can serve to define supportive group
norms, and identification with the group increases the influence
of such norms.70
At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a massive
upsurge in mutual caring behaviours among members of the
public.71 Mutual social support among members of the public
took different forms, partly reflecting community members’ differ-
ing needs. Moreover, the requirement for some to self-isolate at
home meant that there were multiple simultaneous needs.
Neighbours helped neighbours with shopping, collecting medical
prescriptions, dog walking, providing information and emotional
support.72 For example, in one week in April 2020, the Office for
National Statistics survey found that nearly two-thirds of adults sur-
veyed said other local community members would support them if
they needed help during the pandemic, and over one in three adults
said they had done shopping or other tasks for neighbours in the
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previous week.73 Identification with the community has been shown
to be a predictor of helping neighbours in these ways.43
In addition to informal interactions between neighbours, a very
large number of organised mutual aid and community support
groups were set up. One estimate made in May 2020 was that
there were 4300 such groups connecting an estimated 3 million
people in the UK.74 These ranged from Facebook groups (which
acted simply to connect requests for help with offers from volun-
teers) to those groups that cooked food and carried out deliveries
themselves. One research study concluded that such groups have
been crucial in the society’s response to the pandemic.75
A number of studies are now investigating the psychology of
volunteering and mutual aid during the pandemic. A survey by
Abrams et al76 found that, compared with other participants,
those who had volunteered to help others in the context of the pan-
demic reported higher trust in others to follow the guidelines, higher
trust in the government, higher compassion for people living in
their local area and stronger connections with their family,
friends, colleagues and neighbours. Although some mutual aid
groups have been ‘emergent’, reflecting new relationships among
participants,75 many others are extensions of existing community
groups and are based on existing social capital.75
Previous research on ‘altruistic communities’ in other kinds of
disaster77 suggests that these groups decline over time as people
run out of emotional and physical resources or the state steps
in.78 There has been only limited research on how such groups
sustain themselves over time. But it would seem that some of the
factors that can help include a group identity, a place to meet and
talk about the group and its aims, commemorative events,
support (but not co-option) from local authorities and alliances
with other groups.5,79
Conclusions and recommendations
There are many reasons why it is important to understand the role
of group processes in the COVID-19 pandemic, but we will focus
here on two of the most important ones. The first reason is that,
without a proper understanding of group processes, practitioners
and policy makers might instead make decisions by drawing upon
‘folk psychologies’. Examples of folk psychology include the
assumption that the public will necessarily panic and be incapable
of taking the responsibility needed when crisis strikes.7
Emergency management strategies based on these assumptions,
such as use of coercion and withholding information from the
public, are known to be ineffective and even counterproductive.5
In the case of COVID-19, we have just seen the damaging conse-
quences of relying on folk-psychological assumptions. The
‘common sense’ notion of supposed public fatigue was one explan-
ation given for the timing of the implementation of necessary phys-
ical distancing and ‘lockdown’measures, with critics suggesting that
the implementation of such measures was delayed and that this
delay has cost lives.52,80
Second, if behaviour in the pandemic is a function of mutable
group processes rather than fixed tendencies, then behavioural
change is possible. This means that we can help design more effect-
ive interventions to facilitate collective resilience in the face of the
pandemic and other collective threats. Therefore, based on the
above, and in line with other sets of recommendations, both in rela-
tion to the pandemic5,81–83 and to emergencies more generally,2,84
our recommendations are as follows.
Provide clear and credible information on risk from a trusted
source. People are more persuaded by messages from fellow in-
group members than out-group members. More specifically,
where a group member is seen as embodying the group’s identity
and values, this increases follower adherence to their guidance.85
Therefore, those responsible for the communication of information
on risk need to ensure that the messaging is clear, but also to con-
sider who would be the best person to deliver that message and
how that person can create a connection with the audience.
Focus on our common interests and identity to engage people in
the commitments that need to be made (which are mostly for others
rather than for the individual). The importance of clear messaging
extends from the nature and extent of the threat to the actions
that people need to take. The UK Government messaging that jus-
tified staying at home in terms of ‘protecting the NHS’, and that pro-
moted distancing behaviours and wearing face coverings for others
(rather than the personal self), were some of the most effective.
Listen to, recognise, and resource community support groups to
give them agency to sustain themselves over time. In the UK, the
importance of community mutual aid groups is recognised at a
national level by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the
Communities Prepared National Group, as well as by many local
resilience forums. It is evident that official bodies have learned a
lot from mutual aid groups. There is understanding that such
groups play a vital role and need to be supported.75 But it also
important that support for such groups is based on the group’s
needs even if these do not completely align with those of the
authorities.
At the time of writing (October 2020), we are still in the rela-
tively early days of the pandemic. Although many research studies
have been carried out on public behaviour during the pandemic,
there is still much we do not know. Priorities for the future
include understanding how the group processes described here
can contribute to recovery, mitigate the ongoing effects of secondary
stressors on mental health, and enhance public engagement with
vaccines.
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